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Abstract
This paper derives a Phillips curve with imported commodities as an additional
input in the production process. Given greater reliance on exogenously priced im-
ported commodities in production then changes in output lead to a reduced impact on
marginal costs and prices. The Phillips curve becomes ￿ atter relative to the bench-
mark New Keynesian case. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that greater
imported commodity intensity in production increases the sacri￿ce ratio. Econometri-
cally controlling for imported commodity intensity also doubles the explanatory power
of openness in determining the sacri￿ce ratio, as conjectured by Romer (1993).
JEL classi￿cations: E31, E32, F41
Keywords: openness, imported commodties, sacri￿ce ratio1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e⁄ects of imported materials costs and trade openness on the
slope of the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve represents the feasible set of combinations
of output growth and in￿ ation in the short-run; a ￿ atter slope means less in￿ ation for a
given real expansion and equivalently, disin￿ ation becomes more costly in terms of reduced
output. Romer (1993) conjectures that the negative relation between in￿ ation and openness
is driven by steeper Phillips curves in more open economies, but the subsequent empirical
literature has been far from supportive of this hypothesis.
To resolve theory and data we put forward a new explanation of the link between the
slope of the Phillips curve and openness. In particular, we consider the impact of imported
commodities in the production process. In the standard New Keynesian model increased
output increases marginal costs because of upward sloping labour supply. Given the ￿xed
markup of monopolisitically-competitive ￿rms, increased prices and in￿ ation eventually en-
sue. However, marginal production costs also depend on inputs other than labour. Imported
commodities such as oil and gas, natural resources in general, and intermediate production
goods such as iron, steel, chemicals and textiles can all play an important role in determining
marginal production costs, and the prices of these commodities are plausibly exogenous for
most countries unlike wages. In small open economies, changes in production will not change
the prices of these commodities. It is also the case that real commodity costs have risen in
recent years, and that producers have pointed to these as important drivers of their day-to-
day pricing and output decisions. The crucial point is that when imported commodities are
important in the production process then the link between increased output and marginal
1production costs weakens. If ￿rms markup at a constant rate, and there is price rigidity, the
resulting Phillips curve is ￿ atter.
Ostensibly the arguments of this paper and that of Romer (1993) point in di⁄erent di-
rections. Romer￿ s mechanism (described below) has openness steepening the Phillips curve.
The mechanism proposed in this paper has increased imported commodity intensity ￿ at-
tening the Phillips curve. However, the two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and a
principal objective of this paper is to separate out the two e⁄ects. Previous empirical work
has been far from decisive in con￿rming the relationship between openness and the slope of
the Phillips curve, and the research presented here suggests a reconciliation of this literature.
Just including one measure of openness falls fouls of omitted variable bias. Given a posi-
tive correlation between imported commodity intensity and openness, omitting the former
will bias inference concerning the latter towards insigni￿cance. When separate measures for
openness and imported commodities are both included in a regression analysis, the data are
supportive of both hypotheses.
In the next section the literature addressing the relationship between openness and the
Phillips curve is brie￿ y reviewed. Section 3 presents a formal theoretical analysis of the
e⁄ects of imported commodities on the Phillips curve slope in a standard New Keynesian
macro model. Section 4 contains an empirical analysis of the e⁄ects of commodity imports
as well as openness on the Phillips curve slope as measured by sacri￿ce ratios and section 5
concludes.
22 Literature Review
Romer (1993) documents a negative correlation between the level of in￿ ation and the de-
gree of openness. A potential explanation of this ￿nding could be from time-inconsistency
in￿ ation-bias type arguments as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983). At low levels of in￿ ation the policymaker has an incentive to expand the economy,
moving rightward along the feasible in￿ ation-output set de￿ned by the Phillips Curve. The
￿ atter this curve, the greater the ratio of increased output to increased in￿ ation, and the
greater the temptation to in￿ ate. The private sector rationally anticipates this and hence
Nash equilibrium entails greater mean in￿ ation. Because of the empirical regularity that
in￿ ation is negatively associated with openness, Romer (1993) conjectures that the Phillips
curve is steeper in open economies. His theoretical rationale is that in more open economies
unanticipated monetary expansions lead to real depreciation and this translates into higher
in￿ ation through higher import prices. The in￿ ation originating through the exchange rate
channel does not add to output and consequently, under discretionary policy, the policymaker
has less incentive to in￿ ate.
An alternative and more straightforward mechanism leading to the same conclusion is
provided by Lane (1997). In his model there are non-tradeable and tradeable sectors and
as normal the non-traded sector increases output following a monetary shock. However, the
smaller the non-traded sector, the smaller the bene￿ts from the surprise in￿ ation. The more
open the economy, the lower the incentives for the central bank to in￿ ate.
The empirical evidence has been far from supportive of the Romer (1993) hypothesis. In
earlier work, Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) (BMR) estimated output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄
3measures for 43 countries, notably ￿nding robust evidence that it is a⁄ected by the level
of in￿ ation. Yet, the openness measure, when included in their regressions, turned out to
be not statistically signi￿cant. Similarly Temple (2002) found no evidence of a link with
openness using either BMR￿ s trade-o⁄ measures or Ball￿ s (1994) estimates of the sacri￿ce
ratio.
Daniels et al. (2005) correctly criticize this literature for failing to control for central
bank independence. The in￿ ation-bias story requires discretionary policy, and at least in
principle greater central bank independence should ameliorate the e⁄ect of openness on the
sacri￿ce ratio. However, when they include the interaction of openness and measures of
central bank independence, they ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of openness upon the sacri￿ce ratio,
that is openness ￿ attens the Phillips curve rather than steepening it.
In response to this slew of negative evidence, Razin and Huen (2002) and Daniels and
VanHoose (2006) propose alternative theoretical reasons underpinning ￿ atter Phillips Curves
in more open economies. In Razin and Huen (2002) openness is also associated with greater
capital mobility, enabling greater consumption smoothing through the cycle and increased
strategic complementary among producers and stickier prices; the end result is a ￿ atter
Phillips curve. In Daniels and VanHoose openness reduces the income elasticity of spending
on domestic goods, and anticipating this, domestic price-setters do not increase prices as
much when output expands. As Bowdler (forthcoming) discusses, both of these contributions
rely on fairly speci￿c microeconomic arguments to generate the required result. We would
certainly not argue against these explanations, as it is di¢ cult to test or evaluate the key
mechanisms in both cases. It is quite possible that these explanations go some way in
resolving the theory with the data, but we argue that the theory proposed in this paper is
4considerably simpler, and has the additional advantage of being easier to test.
Finally Bowdler (forthcoming) makes a substantial contribution to the literature by up-
dating the BMR in￿ ation-output measures and Ball￿ s sacri￿ce ratios for a later time period.
We agree with Bowdler that his sample (1981-1998) is preferable to the older data (1961-88)
in that the shocks in the later sample are more plausibly generated by monetary shocks. The
earlier period is likely to be contaminated by supply-side shocks, rendering accurate estima-
tion of the Phillips curve slope di¢ cult. Bowdler also argues that the extant empirical work
is ￿ awed in that it fails to control adequately for the exchange rate regime. The key com-
ponent in Romer￿ s hypothesis is that a real depreciation follows a monetary shock. Clearly
the extent to which a depreciation occurs will depend on the exchange rate regime. Using
the newer data, Bowdler estimates the impact of openness on the sacri￿ce ratio, allowing
the impact to vary with measures of the ￿xity of the exchange rate regime. He ￿nds some
evidence of a negative relationship between the alternative measure of the Phillips curve
slope and openness.
3 Theory
In this section we extend the standard New Keynesian framework as summarized in Gali
(2008) to analyze formally the impact on the Phillips curve of imported commodities in the
production process. It may be simpler to think of this commodity throughout this section
as a single input such as oil, though the argument generalizes to all imported intermediate
goods. As noted in the introduction these commodities may take many forms, and have
come to represent an increasing fraction of producer costs in recent years. Here the novel
5elements are outlined but the full details are presented in the appendix.
There is a continuum of ￿rms indexed by i 2 [0;1] all facing the same production function:




where Yt (i) is ￿rm-level output, Nt (i) is ￿rm-level employment, At is technology, Ot repre-
sents the imported commodity input into the production process and ￿ and ￿ are parameters.
When ￿ is equal to unity the production function reduces to the standard case considered
by Gali and others. As a simpli￿cation it is assumed that all ￿rms have the same imported
commodity requirement. Without this simpli￿cation it would not be possible to generate an
analytical solution and it is not at all clear that allowing idiosyncratic commodity demand
would alter the main argument. In the appendix a ￿rst order approximation to the aggregate
production function is given by
yt = at + (1 ￿ ￿)nt + (1 ￿ ￿)ot
with lower case variables denoting logs and yt and nt denoting aggregate output and em-
ployment. Demand for imported commodities depends on their price and is given by




t ￿ pt is the real price of imported commodities.
Adding these ingredients to the standard New Keynesian model of Calvo (1983) price-
6setters yields a Phillips curve
￿t = ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿e yt + ￿ut
where e yt is deviation of output from the natural rate, ut = (po
t ￿ pt) ￿ ro where ro are long-
run real commodity prices, ￿ and ￿ are composite parameters. This is our modi￿ed Phillips
Curve and represents a generalization of the benchmark case - equation (21) in chapter 3
of Gali (2008). The cost-push shock term ut is formally derived from the process governing
commodity prices, and the economy￿ s sensitivity to these shocks is given by the structural
parameters in ￿. Mathematically the slope of the Phillips curve may be steeper or ￿ atter
than under the benchmark case, with the condition for this given by
￿o ? ￿b
where ￿o corresponds to ￿ derived in the general case, and ￿b is the value of ￿ when ￿ = 1
(the benchmark case).
Proposition 1 The greater the importance of imported commodities in the production process,
the ￿atter the Phillips Curve.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The intuition for this proposition is reasonably straightforward. When imported com-
modities are important in the production process, and the economy is small, then marginal
costs do not increase by as much for given output increases. Commodity prices are ex-
ogenous, and increasing production doesn￿ t feed into higher marginal production costs to
7the extent when the key (or only) margin is additional labor. When ￿rms markup at a
constant rate (depending on their market power), then following output increases optimal
prices correspondingly do not increase by as much and the resultant in￿ ation is dampened.
4 Empirical Evidence
This section asks two questions following from the theory above. Firstly, whether greater
imported commodity intensity in the production process ￿ attens the Phillips curve, or equiv-
alently increases the sacri￿ce ratio. Secondly, whether incorporating commodity intensity af-
fects inference concerning the impact of openness as conventionally de￿ned upon the Phillips
curves slope. Our prior is that a more robust negative relationship between openness and
the sacri￿ce ratio should appear once commodity intensity is controlled for. Data for com-
modity intensity come from the World Trade Organization who provide annual merchandise
trade by commodity data for most of its members from 1980. To capture exogenously priced
commodity imports used in production we sum the series for fuel and mining, iron and steel,
machinery and transport products, chemicals and textiles, and divide by GDP:
INPUTSit = (fuel and mining+iron and steel+machinery
and transport products+chemicals+textiles imports)/GDP.
Because these data are only available from 1980 we utilize Bowdler￿ s updated series for the
sacri￿ce ratio. This dataset consists of estimated sacri￿ce ratios for 71 disin￿ ations in 38
countries over the period 1981-1998. As noted above these data have the additional advantage
8of being constructed during a period of time when it was more likely that movements in
in￿ ation and output were driven by monetary shocks rather than from the supply side.
The estimation strategy also follows Bowdler. Each disin￿ ation corresponds to a partic-
ular time period and country and, following previous research, the explanatory variables are
measured as averages over the corresponding period. Thus openness is measured as total im-
ports as a share of GDP using data from the IMF and averaged over the relevant disin￿ ation
period (OPENi). Other control variables used are constructed in exactly the same way as
in Bowdler, though we augment his speci￿cation to include average imported commodities
over the relevant subperiod. In particular we estimate
SRi = ￿0 + ￿1OPENi + ￿2OPENEXi + ￿3INPUTSi + ￿4LENGTHi
+￿5INFLOSSi + ￿6PEAKi + ￿7CBIi + ￿8OPENCBIi (2)
where the sacri￿ce ratio is denoted by SRi, and OPENEXi is the product of OPENi and
the Reinhart and Rogo⁄(2004) exchange rate measure (EXi). LENGTHi is the disin￿ ation
length in years, INFLOSSi is the reduction in in￿ ation during the disin￿ ation, PEAKi is
the in￿ ation rate in the year in which the disin￿ ation started, CBIi is an index of central bank
independence and OPENCBIi is the interaction of openness and central bank independence
included following the argument of Daniels et al. (2005).
Before reporting the results of the regression analysis it is worth taking a closer look at
the key explanatory variables. Figure 1 depicts a scatter plot of INPUTSi against OPENi.
As expected there is a fairly strong positive correlation between the two variables. Countries
9which are open tend to rely on imported commodities to a greater extent. If it is the case
that the mechanism proposed by Romer (1993) and that proposed here both contribute
to variation in the Phillips curve slope then putting openness by itself into the regression
analysis commits omitted variable bias. In particular a regression which includes openness
alone will be biased towards rejecting Romer￿ s hypothesis.
Table 1 presents the regression results. Column 1 replicates Bowdler￿ s column 2 in Table
1. The results are similar to his and the minor di⁄erences can be attributed to primary
data revisions. The sign of the openness coe¢ cient is negative, consistent with Romer￿ s
hypothesis, but is not statistically signi￿cant. This is also the case with the interaction
of openness and the exchange rate regime. Indeed the only statistically signi￿cant term is
LENGTH as in Bowdler. Column 2 drops the CBI terms, allowing for a bigger sample, and
in this regression OPEN is negative and signi￿cant at the 5% level though as in Bowdler
OPENEX is insigni￿cant. We interpret this as evidence pointing towards the mechanism
put forward by Lane (1997) rather than that of Romer (1993). Romer￿ s theory relies on
depreciation, whereas Lane￿ s does not. Clearly the interaction term is not signi￿cant, and so
it is di¢ cult to conclude that mechanisms involving movements in the exchange rate explain
the link between openness and the Phillips curve.
Column 3 includes the new variable INPUTS. The new variable itself exhibits a positive
sign, consistent with the theory above, and is signi￿cant at the 10% level. The sample is
slightly reduced due to data availability, but nonetheless the results support the argument
that greater imported commodity intensity in the production process increases the sacri￿ce
ratio and ￿ attens the Phillips curve. Given the coe¢ cient estimate and holding all else
constant, a one-standard-deviation increase (0.06) in imported commodity intensity increases
10the sacri￿ce ratio by 0.5, which represents a meaningful change in the feasible outcome set
faced by policymakers.
Also noteworthy from column 3 is the fact that the estimated coe¢ cient for the variable
OPEN more than doubles in magnitude, and becomes signi￿cant at almost the 1% level
once INPUTS is included. Given a one-standard-deviation change in openness (0.13) the
sacri￿ce ratio increases by 1.0 almost exactly. The increase in size and signi￿cance con￿rms
the possibility of an omitted variable bias problem when the role of imported commodities
is ignored. Omission of imported commodity intensity in the regression analysis leads to
serious underestimation of the explanatory power of openness.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a new theory explaining the link between the slope of the Phillips curve
and openness. The channel is through imported commodities in the production process.
When production is reliant upon imported commodities, which as opposed to wages are
priced exogenously, then changes in production levels have less impact on marginal costs.
In the New Keynesian literature this means less impact on optimal prices and in￿ ation: the
Phillips curve is ￿ atter, and sacri￿ce ratios are larger.
Using data for imported commodities that are plausibly inputs in the production process
we ￿nd that there is a positive association between imported commodity intensity and the
sacri￿ce ratio, at least signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Previous econometric work has been far from decisive in supporting Romer￿ s original hy-
pothesis of steeper Phillips curves in more open economies, although Bowdler (forthcoming)
11does ￿nd evidence of a weak negative relationship between openness and the sacri￿ce ratio.
The evidence presented here is in contrast much more supportive of Romer￿ s hypothesis.
Once commodity intensity is controlled for, the impact of openness on the steepness of the
Phillips curve doubles.
12Appendix 1 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
Households







i.e. demand for good i depends on aggregate demand (Ct) and relative prices (
Pt(i)
Pt ) with
elasticity determined by ￿. Labor supply and the Euler equation are respectively given in
(3) and (4):
wt ￿ pt = ￿ct + ’nt (3)
where wt is the log of wages, pt is the log of the price level, ct is the log of consumption (in
this section a single good) and nt is the log of employment and ￿ and ’ are parameters from
the utility function. The consumption Euler equation is given by
ct = Et fct+1g ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ Et f￿t+1g ￿ ￿) (4)
where Et fg is the expectations operator, it is the nominal interest rate, ￿t+1 = pt+1 ￿ pt is
the in￿ ation rate and ￿ is the discount rate.
Firms
Firms have production functions as given by (1) in the main text.
13Price Setting and Price Dynamics
Given Calvo pricing aggregate price dynamics are described by
￿
1￿￿






where ￿t ￿ Pt
Pt￿1 is the gross in￿ ation rate between t ￿ 1 and t and P ￿
t is the price set in
period t by ￿rms reoptimizing their price in that period. In a steady state with zero in￿ ation
(￿ = 1) we must have P ￿
t = Pt￿1 = Pt for all t. A log-linear approximation to the aggregate
price index around that steady state yields
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)(p
￿
t ￿ pt￿1):
The optimal price itself is a constant markup on marginal costs depending on the elasticity
of substitution of consumption. Given Calvo price-setting, then
p
￿










Market clearing in the goods market requires that
Yt (i) = Ct (i)
14De￿ning aggregate output as the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator then
Yt = Ct:
The IS curve is
yt = Et fyt+1g ￿ (it ￿ Et f￿t+1g ￿ ￿):



















































(1 ￿ ￿)nt = yt + (1 ￿ ￿)ot + dt








di is equal to zero up to a ￿rst-order approximation
around a zero in￿ ation steady state. Therefore an approximate log-linear aggregate produc-
15tion relation is
yt = at + (1 ￿ ￿)nt + (1 ￿ ￿)ot








The ￿rst term can be written as
MC
1
t = expfwt + nt ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)g:
De￿ne the labour share sl
t ￿ wt + nt ￿ (pt + yt) and note that in the steady state sl￿ =
log(1 ￿ ￿). A ￿rst-order approximation of the ￿rst term is therefore
MC
1
t ￿ 1 + wt + nt ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿):





t + ot ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)g
with the steady state oil share so￿ = log(1 ￿ ￿), hence
MC
2
t ￿ 1 + p
o
t + ot ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿):
Given that for x;z close to zero (i.e. small deviations from steady state income shares), then
16for v = (1 + x) + (1 + z), log(v) ￿ x + z hence
mct ￿ wt + nt ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿) + p
o
t + ot ￿ (pt + yt) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
and substituting in economy-wide oil demand, po
t ￿ pt = log(1 ￿ ￿) + yt ￿ ot, then
mct ￿ wt ￿ pt + nt ￿ yt ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿):
Substituting in nt from the production function, nt =
yt￿at￿(1￿￿)ot
1￿￿ then
mct ￿ wt ￿ pt +
yt ￿ at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ot
1 ￿ ￿
￿ yt ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ wt ￿ pt ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
fat ￿ ￿yt + (1 ￿ ￿)otg ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
and substituting in for ot again then
mct ￿ wt ￿ pt ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
fat ￿ ￿yt + (1 ￿ ￿)[log(1 ￿ ￿) + yt ￿ (p
o
t ￿ pt)]g ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ wt ￿ pt +








[log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (p
o
t ￿ pt)] ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ wt ￿ pt +



















17For a ￿rm in period t + k which last reset its price in period t
mct+kjt = wt ￿ pt +































t ￿ pt+k) (6)
which is analogous to equation (14) in Chapter 3 of Gali. Notice there is an additional term
(￿(1 ￿ ￿)) making the responsiveness of marginal costs to output ￿ atter. In the traditional
New Keynesian case increasing output necessarily increases marginal costs. The only input
into the production process is labour and increasing the labour input necessarily increases
the real wage rate which is endogenous for the economy as a whole. When part of the costs of
production (i.e. energy inputs) are exogenous then the relationship between marginal costs
and economic activity ￿ attens.
Substituting (6) into (5)
p
￿


































































































1 ￿ ￿ + ￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
c mct + pt+k
￿




k Et f￿c mct + pt+kg
hence
￿t = ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿c mct (7)
where ￿ =
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ ￿ and ￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿+￿[￿￿(1￿￿)].
Using the above result, that
mct ￿ wt￿pt+
















and substituting in the household￿ s optimality condition,
mct ￿ ￿yt + ’nt +







































yt ￿ at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ot
1 ￿ ￿
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and ￿nally substituting in the oil demand equation po
t ￿ pt = log(1 ￿ ￿) + yt ￿ ot
mct ￿














































log(1 ￿ ￿) (8)
which is a generalization of equation (17) in chapter 3 of Gali. Note that the coe¢ cient
linking economy-wide marginal costs and aggregate production has reduced. The intuition
is similar to that for the discussion following equation (6). Increased production does not
impact upon marginal costs in the aggregate as well as for individual ￿rms when oil intensity
is higher.
Steady-state marginal costs are constant and given by the markup parameter, ￿￿. In
20the steady-state output is at its steady state level and real oil prices are at their long-run
equilibrium value ro:
mc ￿



















log(1 ￿ ￿): (9)
The ￿ exible prices (natural rate) level of output is thus given as
y
n









￿+￿(1￿￿)+’￿(1￿￿)(1+’) which can be compared with the outcome under ￿ exible prices
and perfect competition described above. The only di⁄erence is that the constant term is
reduced due to the market power the ￿rms have under the monopolistically competitive
market structure.
Subtracting (9) from (8) yields
c mct =









t ￿ pt) ￿ r
o] (10)
Equation (10) shows that marginal costs deviate from their long-run equilibrium when output
is above its natural level and when the oil price is above its natural level.
Finally, combining (10) with (7) yields
￿t = ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿e yt + ￿ut
21where e yt = yt ￿ yn
t , ut = (po





and ￿ = ￿
(1+’)(1￿￿)
1￿￿ .
Appendix 2 Proof of proposition
For proposition 1 to obtain we need ￿b > ￿o. i.e.,
￿o
￿




















￿ ￿ and ￿ = 1￿￿
1￿￿+￿[￿￿(1￿￿)].
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ (1 + ’)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
?
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ (1 + ’)(1 ￿ ￿)
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
?
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
1 ￿
(1 + ’)(1 ￿ ￿)
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
? 1 ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
(1 + ’)
’ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
?
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
Note that the condition for whether or not ￿o ? ￿b is independent of oil intensity (￿) (though
for given values of other parameters, increased oil intensity will magnify the di⁄erence).
Given plausible parameter values, it is likely to be the case that ￿b > ￿o. For example, if
we take the case of log utility (’ = ￿ = 1) then the condition reduces to ￿b > ￿o =) ￿ > 1.
The elasticity of demand parameter must be greater than unity otherwise the ￿rm could
22simply increase pro￿ts by reducing output. Furthermore the elasticity of demand parameter






would typically only expect these pro￿ts to be in the order of a few percent e.g. Gali (2002)
sets ￿ = 11, a value which is consistent with a 10% markup. Thus we conclude that in
general we would expect that ￿b > ￿o, hence a steeper Phillips curve in the benchmark case,
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Observations 53 69 63
R2 0.34 0.38 0.40
Table 1: Regression Results
The dependent variable is the sacri￿ce ratio. All data are constructed following Bowdler
(forthcoming). Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
25References
Ball, Laurence (1994). What determines the sacri￿ce ratio? in Monetary Policy, edited by
N. Gregory Mankiw, pp. 155-82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ball, Laurence, N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer (1988). The new Keynesian economics
and the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1-65.
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model
of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101-21.
Bowdler, Christopher (forthcoming). Openness, exchange rate regimes and the Phillips curve.
Journal of International Money and Finance.
Calvo, Guillermo (1983). Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Journal of
Monetary Economics 12: 383-398.
Daniels, Joseph P., Farrokh Nourzad and David D. VanHoose (2005). Openness, central
bank independence and the sacri￿ce ratio. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 34:
611-630.
Daniels, Joseph P., and David VanHoose (2006). Openness, the sacri￿ce ratio and in￿ ation:
is there a puzzle? Journal of International Money and Finance 8: 1336-1347.
Gali, Jordi (2008). Monetary Policy, In￿ ation, and the Business Cycle: an introduction to
the New Keynesian framework. Princeton University Press: NJ.
Kydland, Finn. E. and Edward C. Prescott (1977). Rules rather than discretion: the incon-
sistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-92.
26Lane, Philip R. (1997). In￿ ation in open economies. Journal of International Economics 42:
327-47.
Razin, Assaf and Chi Wa Yuen (2002). The ￿ New Keynesian￿Phillips curve: closed economy
vs open economy. Economics Letters 75: 1-9.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Ken S. Rogo⁄ (2004). The modern history of exchange rate
arrangements: a reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 1-48.
Romer, David (1993). Openness and in￿ ation: theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 100:1169-1189.
Temple, Jonathan R. W. (2002). Openness, in￿ ation and the Phillips curve: a puzzle. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 34: 450-468.
27